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Abstract 
Recent studies have shown that announcements of US macroeconomic news had significant 
impact on European stock markets. However, importance of information about the US economy 
may vary in time. In order to analyze this issue we examine impact of announcements of 
unexpected US macroeconomic news on the prices of selected stocks listed on the Vienna Stocks 
Exchange. Based on 5-minute returns of 13 stocks we examine how the strength and the 
significance of reaction of investors to unexpected macroeconomic news form the US has changed 
in the recent 15 years. Application of event study methodology allows us precisely describe such 
reaction in first minutes after news announcements.    
 
Keywords: event study, macroeconomic announcements, intraday data  
JEL classification: G14, E44 
 
1. Introduction 
In contemporary economics the performance of stock exchanges has an essential 
impact on the real economy and, vice versa data on the real economy impacts stock 
exchanges. The ultimate direction of interaction depends on the size of the economy that is 
the source of the data. Therefore we can expect that the most influential macroeconomic data 
comes from the US It is clear that due to globalization not only US stock exchanges, but also 
other stock exchanges can be impacted by US macroeconomic data. 
The first studies investigated the impact of US macroeconomic data on the US and on 
large developed markets (e.g. Schwert, 1981; Pearce and Roley, 1985; Li and Hu, 1998; 
Nikkinen and Sahlström, 2004; Boyd et al., 2005; Andersen et al., 2007; Harju and Hussain, 
2011). The emerging markets especially in the CEE region and small developed markets also 
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 from Europe were only of limited interest in financial journals (e.g. Hanousek et al., 2009; 
Gurgul and Wójtowicz, 2015). 
Research on stock market reactions to news from the US economy has been conducted 
using a number of methods and for different time periods. Therefore, it is not easy to evaluate 
the results and compare them in turbulent and calm time periods. 
The main goal of our study is to examine the impact of unexpected news about the US 
economy on returns of stocks listed on the Vienna Stock Exchange (VSE). In order to assess 
the reaction to the US data we used 5-minute returns based on tick by tick data of the largest 
companies listed on the VSE from January 2006 to the end of June 2020.  
High frequency (HF) data supplied by computer programs has become the dominating 
form of transactions on financial markets in recent years. HF traders who supply liquidity are 
able to update quotes immediately after the arrival of the news. In this way they reduce 
adverse selection risk, comp. Hoffman (2014). Using this data allows us to establish the 
strength and significance of the impact of US macroeconomic news in the period under 
consideration. The long period of this study includes both the time of bull market and bear 
market time periods.  
This research takes into account data that comes from three large financial crises: the 
subprime crisis in 2007-08, the global financial crisis (GFC) in 2008-09 and the European 
debt crisis in 2010-14. 
This paper also extends previous work by applying event study methodology to 
intraday data. To verify the significance and the strength of the impact of announcements of US 
macroeconomic data on stock prices, we apply the nonparametric rank test published by 
Kolari and Pynnönen (2011). It is a generalization of the widely used, traditional test of 
Corrado and Zivney (1992). The use of more recent event study methodology, instead 
of the commonly used GARCH models or regressions with dummy variables, allows us to 
analyze more precisely the significance of the reaction of returns of companies included in 
ATX to the news under consideration.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we give a 
short overview of the literature on the effects of macroeconomic announcements on financial 
markets. In section 3 we describe US macroeconomic indicators and returns used in this 
study. We also give some brief information about the event study methodology used. 
The empirical results and discussion of results are presented in section 4. The final section 
concludes the paper. 
 2. Literature Review 
Macroeconomic news announcements are the most important risk factors for financial 
markets. This is the case because the state of the economy reflected in these announcements is 
one of the main risk sources of risk. Moreover, this source of risk cannot be accounted for as a 
diversifiable risk. 
The first studies concerning the effects of US macroeconomic data announcements 
focused on the US stock market (Geske and Roll, 1983; McQueen and Roley, 1993). Over the 
following years studies were carried out with respect to developed markets. The results 
confirmed the importance of macroeconomic news from the US economy.  
In the economic literature many examples of the impact of foreign macroeconomic 
news on domestic financial markets can be found. This is the case in the study by Hanousek 
et al. (2009) concerning the response of asset prices to macroeconomic announcements in 
three CEE countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland using intraday data. The 
contributors found that the Czech stock market is impacted more by the US macroeconomic 
announcements than by EU macroeconomic announcements. 
Kroencke et al.(2016) underline that the relationship between financial markets and 
macroeconomic announcement  risk can arise through two pathways:  
(a) news on macroeconomic data which is sometimes published unexpectedly,  
and more probable and important second channel 
(b) even if news of macroeconomic variables occur on the pre-scheduled date, the 
exact values of these factors can   only be anticipated. 
Therefore, it is essential to measure the expectations about the macroeconomic 
announcements. In this case, consensus estimations of professionals are highly appreciated. 
They are thought to be a reliable source for predicting these values. According to the semi-
strong form of the efficient market hypothesis formulated by Fama (1970) the forecasted 
values are already included in the pricing of an asset after the consensus data are published. 
However, there is still a preserved component in the form of the not unexpected difference 
between the predicted and the announced data. This value is known in the literature as the 
surprise component. 
Ederington and Lee (1993) found a significant effect of regularly scheduled US 
macroeconomic announcements on the volatility of the US treasury and foreign exchange 
futures. 
 In their study Nikkinen and Sahlström (2004) tried to find the effects of US and 
German and Finnish macroeconomic news on the German and Finnish stock markets, and the 
most important role of information from the US came to light. The authors detected that 
volatility in both markets reacts significantly only to US macroeconomic announcements, on 
the unemployment rate and PPI. This group of stock markets was also the subject of research 
by Nikkinen et al. (2006). They analyzed the impact of US macroeconomic news 
announcements on 35 stock markets all around the world. This sample contained also some 
developed and emerging markets from Europe. The results was that unexpected US 
macroeconomic announcements have effects on volatility on developed stock markets in 
Europe and Asia. According to this study the reaction of volatility from emerging CEE 
markets (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia and Slovakia) to announcements of 
US macroeconomic indicators was not significant. However, this observation may be not 
correct due to the use of data from the early period of the development of stock markets in the 
CEE region. This remark is justified by the opposite results shown by Gurgul et al. (2012) 
obtained on the basis of data from January 2004 to December 2011. These results confirmed a 
significant reaction of daily returns of the Polish index WIG20 to unexpected US news on 
inflation and industrial production in the US. 
Bredin et al. (2007) used event study methodology to conduct a comprehensive study 
on the impact of changes in UK monetary policy on UK stock returns. He tried to find the 
possible reasons for such responses. They assessed the effects of unexpected changes in 
monetary policy on aggregate and sectoral stock returns. This kind of decomposition of 
unexpected changes in the policy rate was based on future markets data. The authors used 
variance decomposition, and found the pathways of response of stock returns to monetary 
policy surprises. Their results indicate that  monetary policy shocks cause a persistent 
negative response in terms of future excess returns for a number of sectors. 
More precise and reliable results on the effects of US macroeconomic news on 
European markets were obtained in different studies by applying intraday data. On the basis 
of five-minute returns Andersen et al. (2007 proved the impact of US macroeconomic news 
on US, German and British stock, bond and foreign exchange markets. Harju and Hussain‘s 
study (2011) is also based on high-frequency data. The authors checked the impact of 
scheduled US macroeconomic announcements on four developed stock markets from Europe, 
namely British, French, German and Swiss. They established that announcements of CPI, 
PPI, retail sales, durable goods orders, unemployment rate and industrial production are 
sources of essential and prompt changes of volatility and 5-minute returns of CAC40, 
 DAX30, FTSE100 and SMI. In line with these results were the results published by Dimpfl 
(2011). He dealt with 1-minute returns of DAX from July 2003 to December 2006. Dimpfl 
found that investors on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange react almost immediately after a news 
release. This reaction is visible not later than ten minutes after. 
Gurgul and Wójtowicz (2015) proved the reaction of the Austrian stock exchange to 
US macroeconomic news. Taking into account 1-minute returns of ATX from 2 January 2007 
to 31 December 2013 the authors proved significant impact of the announcements of 10 US 
macroeconomic indicators on returns and volatility. The most significant reaction was after 
the release of news from the US labor market (nonfarm payrolls announcements). Gurgul and 
Wójtowicz (2015) also checked the dynamics of the strength of the reaction of ATX to US 
macroeconomic announcements in this time period. From this study it follows that the 
strongest reaction of ATX to US macroeconomic news was in the time period 2007-2009. The 
reaction after this time period was essentially weaker.  
The effects of macroeconomic news on foreign exchange markets in CEE 
countries was examined by Égert and Kočenda (2014). They found that the exchange rates 
of the currencies of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland react to American 
macroeconomic news announcements. However, this reaction is not unique in the time 
periods (2004-2007) and (2008-2009). Our results below shed new light on the mechanisms 
by which new information in  US macroeconomic news influenced  the stock prices of 
companies listed on the Vienna Stock Exchange.  
3. Data and methodology 
3.1. Announcements 
In this paper we investigate the impact of the announcements of 19 macroeconomic indicators 
that describe various aspects of the US economy. They are:  
Consumer Confidence Index (CCI),  
Consumer Price Index (CPI),  
CPI less food and energy (cCPI) 
Durable Goods Orders (DGO),  
Existing Home Sales (EHS),  
Housing Starts (HS),  
Industrial Production (IP),  
ISM Manufacturing Index (ISM),  
 Initial Jobless Claims (IJC),  
Leading Indicators (LI) 
New Home Sales (NHS),  
Nonfarm Payrolls (NFP),4  
Personal Income (PI) 
Philadelphia Fed Business Outlook Survey (PFBOS) 
Producer Price Index (PPI),  
PPI less food and energy (cPPI) 
Real GDP (GDP), 
Retail Sales (RS), 
Retail Sales less autos (cRS) 
We choose these indicators because they contain the most current information that is 
important for investors. Almost all these indicators are released monthly and they describe the 
economic situation in the US in the previous (or even in the current) month5. This also 
ensures a sufficient number of announcements required to conduct the study. The second 
advantage of the indicators is that they have been widely studied in the literature. Hence we 
can compare the results of the analysis with previous results. 
All the indicators under consideration are released during trading hours on the Vienna 
Stock Exchange. Most of them (CPI, DGO, HS, IJC, NFP, PPI, GDP, and RS) are published 
at 8:30 EST6, CCI, EHS, ISM, and NHS are released at 10:00 EST and only values of IP are 
announced at 9:15 EST. The release times of these indicators correspond to 14:30 CET, 15:15 
CET, 16:00 CET, respectively7.  
These announcements are released on different days of the month and different days of 
the week. The sequence in which US macroeconomic indicator announcements are released 
may play an important role in the perception of them by investors. The earlier the indicator is 
released, the more important it is for investors because it is more probable that it contains 
new, unexpected information. The value of the next indicator released later in the month can 
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 be forecasted on the basis of the value of earlier indicators. The earliest published indicator is 
ISM, which is announced in the first few days of the month. Then, it is followed by NFP, 
which is a part of the Employment Report published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
usually on the first Friday. The majority of the other indicators (CPI, EHS, HS, IP, PPI, and 
RS) are released mainly in the middle of the month, around the 15th. The rest of them (CCI, 
DGO, NHS, and GDP) are released on the last few days of the month. However, it should be 
noted here that values of CCI describe consumers‘ perception of the economic conditions in 
the current month. 
In this paper we study the impact of unexpected news contained in US macroeconomic 
announcements. Thus, for each macroeconomic news release the actual value of the 
announced indicator is compared with its consensus forecast. All comparisons are performed 
on the basis of the consensus published by Econoday a few days before announcements. This 
allows us to divide all releases into three clusters: ‗above consensus‘, ‗below consensus‘ and 
‗in line with consensus‘. Because the news in the last cluster is in line with previous investor 
expectations, our analysis focuses on only the first two clusters, which contain unexpected 
news. 
In order to correctly interpret the results of the analysis we divide the announcements 
according to their meaning rather than make a simple comparison to the consensus. For most 
of the indicators an announcement above consensus is good news because it is expected to 
have a positive impact on a stock market. The only exception is the publications of CPI, PPI 
and IJC whose values greater than forecasts are expected to have a negative impact on stock 
prices (bad news). Analogously, a value of CPI, PPI and IJC lower than forecast is defined as 
good news for a stock market, while in the case of the other indicators it is bad news for 
investors. On the basis of this consideration we divide all the announcements into two 
categories of unexpected news: good news and bad news. For these two sets of data we will 
perform  an empirical analysis. In addition to analyzing the impact of the announcements of 
an individual indicator, we also examine the impact of all good and all bad news. In the set of 
all good (bad) news we take into account only monthly announcements, i.e. excluding IJC 
announcements released weekly. Additionally, when two or more indicators are announced on 
the same day, we consider only the first of them. Subsequent announcements on the same day 
are excluded from the sample because expectations about their value could be heavily 
influenced by earlier news and thus they might be different from consensus. When two or 
more announcements are made at the same time we take them into account only if they do not 
 contain contradictory information, i.e. when each of them is good news, or each of them is 
bad news. 
 3.2. Returns 
To correctly describe the impact of US macroeconomic announcements on investors 
operating on the Vienna Stock Exchange we study 5-minute percentage log-returns8 𝑅𝑖 ,𝑡  of 13 
stocks listed on the VSE in the period from 2 January 2006 to 31 June 2020: 𝑅𝑖 ,𝑡 = 100 𝑙𝑛 𝑃𝑖 ,𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛 𝑃𝑖−1,𝑡 , (1) 
where 𝑃𝑖 ,𝑡  is a stock price at the end of 𝑖-th 5-minute period on day 𝑡. The stocks under 
consideration are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 Names of stocks  
Symbol Name Subsector 
ANDR ANDRITZ AG Industrial Engineering & Machinery 
EBS ERSTE GROUP BANK AG Banking 
EVN EVN AG Multi-Utilities 
MMK MAYR-MELNHOF KARTON AG Packaging 
OMV OMV AG Oil & Gas 
POST OESTERR. POST AG Transportation 
RBI RAIFFEISEN BANK INTERNATIONAL AG Banking 
SBO 
SCHOELLER-BLECKMANN OILFIELD EQUIPMENT 
AG Oil & Gas 
TKA TELEKOM AUSTRIA AG Telecommunications 
VER VERBUND AG KAT. A Electric Utilities 
VIG VIENNA INSURANCE GROUP AG Insurance 
VOE VOESTALPINE AG Mining & Metals 
WIE WIENERBERGER AG Construction Materials 
 
According to speed of adjustment hypothesis, the speed at which new information is 
reflected in stock prices depends on stock liquidity. More actively traded stocks react faster to 
new information than stock which are not popular with investors. Hence to describe the 
                                                          
8
 Application of 5-minute intraday returns is common as a compromise between accuracy and the negative 
effects of market microstructure (e.g. Jones et al., 2005; Andersen et al. 2007; Harju and Hussain, 2011). 
 intensity of trading in stocks of the companies under consideration, in Table 2 we present the 
average number of transactions per minute in individual years of the period under 
consideration. 
 
Table 2. Average number of transactions per minute 
  
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
ANDR 0.5 1.2 1.3 1.1 1.2 1.9 1.7 1.8 1.8 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.2 1.2 
EBS 1.4 2.2 3.9 3.2 3.4 3.7 2.9 3.1 3.5 4.0 4.8 3.9 3.3 2.6 
EVN 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 
MMK 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
OMV 2.4 2.4 2.8 2.6 2.2 2.6 1.7 2.1 2.1 3.3 3.2 3.4 2.6 2.0 
POST 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 1.1 0.9 0.9 0.5 0.4 
RBI 1.2 1.9 3.1 2.0 2.1 1.9 1.4 1.4 3.0 2.9 2.6 2.9 2.5 1.7 
SBO 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.9 0.9 1.1 0.7 0.5 
TKA 1.1 1.6 2.0 1.7 1.3 1.6 1.2 1.1 1.1 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.3 0.2 
VER 0.7 1.2 1.6 1.3 1.2 1.5 0.8 1.1 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.8 1.2 1.2 
VIG 0.4 0.6 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.8 1.6 1.3 0.9 0.5 0.3 
VOE 1.2 2.3 3.1 2.5 2.2 2.7 1.9 1.8 1.8 3.1 3.2 2.8 2.6 2.3 
WIE 0.7 1.3 1.7 1.6 1.2 1.2 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.2 1.7 1.7 0.9 0.7 
 
From Table 2 we observe that the most heavily traded stocks in the whole period 
under consideration are EBS, OMV, VOE, and RBI. All of them usually have on average 
more than two transactions per minute. On the other hand EVN, MMK, SBO, POST, and 
TKA are characterized by the lowest number of transactions. On average MMK and EVN 
have about one transaction per 5-minute period (the average number of transactions per 
minute is about 0.2).  
The period under consideration covers about 15 years characterized by changes in the 
economic situation in the United States and in the whole world. These changes include 
various crises that took place in that time. It is well known that volatility on stock markets 
increases during such turbulent periods. This phenomenon was also observed on the VSE. 
This is also visible in Figure 1 where we present values of standard deviation 𝑆𝑡  computed for 
each day 𝑡 on the basis of 5-min log-returns of VOE from days 𝑡 − 20,… , 𝑡 + 20. Due to 
these changes in volatility, in order to compare the strength of the reaction of stock returns to 
 publications of US macroeconomic indicators in various subperiods of the main period 2006-
2020 we will also consider standardized 5-min returns 𝑆𝑅𝑖 ,𝑡  defined as 5-min log-returns 𝑅𝑖 ,𝑡  
divided by the corresponding standard deviation 𝑆𝑡  defined as above for day 𝑡. In that case, 
standardized returns are expressed in terms of standard deviation of returns.  
 
 
Figure 1. Standard deviations 𝑆𝑡  of 5-min percentage log-returns of VOE in the period 2006-
2020. 
Notes: For each day 𝑡 this figure presents standard deviation of 5-min log-returns computed in the window 𝑡 − 20,… , 𝑡 + 20. In these computations we take into account only intraday returns from continuous trading 
excluding the last and first 15 minutes of a trading session. 
  
3.3.Event study 
To investigate the impact of US macroeconomic news on the intraday returns of stocks form 
the VSE we use an event study methodology. In brief, this is the analysis of the significance 
of the abnormal behavior of returns (abnormal returns) around the event (in the so-called 
event window). In this paper the events are defined as the announcements of unexpected 
macroeconomic news described in Subsection 3.1 and the event window contains three 5-
minute returns before the announcement and twelve returns after it.  
Abnormal returns are defined as the difference between actual returns and their 
expected values computed on the basis of data prior to the event window (form the pre-event 
window). For the i-th event and time t abnormal returns 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡  is defined as: 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸 𝑅𝑖𝑡  𝛺 , (2) 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑡  is a 5-minute return and 𝐸 𝑅𝑖𝑡  𝛺  is the expectation of 𝑅𝑖𝑡  conditional on 
information set 𝛺 form the pre-event window. In this paper we consider a pre-event window 
containing 36 values of 5-minute returns just before the event window. This choice of the 
length of event and pre-event window ensures that the pre-event window starts not earlier 
 than at 10:25CET (when the macroeconomic indicator in announced at 13:30CET) and it does 
not contain intraday returns from the initial part of a trading session with increased volatility. 
To set up the notation let us denote the moment of a news release with 𝑡 = 0. Then the event 
window includes 5-minute returns for 𝑡 = −3,… ,12, while the pre-event window includes 
returns for 𝑡 = −39,… ,−4 . It should be noted here that the impact of the i-th news 
announcement can be observed only for 𝑡 ≥ 1.  
There are various methods of computing expected values of 𝑅𝑖𝑡 . In this paper, 
however, we apply a constant mean model where 𝐸 𝑅𝑖𝑡  𝛺  is equal to the average of returns 
in the pre-event window. It is a simple, but very useful and robust model.  
To test the significance of mean abnormal returns in the event window, we apply the 
nonparametric generalized rank test of Kolari and Pynnönen (2011) with a correction for 
event-implied volatility. The great advantage of this nonparametric test is that it does not 
require any assumption about the normality of abnormal returns. The test statistics is 
constructed as follows. 
 In the fires step of the test procedure we group events into a cluster. The events are 
specific types of announcements, for example the announcements of a given macroeconomic 
indicator that are good (or bad) news for investors. For each 𝑖-th event in the cluster, for 𝑡 = −39,… ,12 we compute abnormal returns 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡  from (2) with 𝐸 𝑅𝑖𝑡  𝛺  computed earlier 
as the average of returns in the pre-event window (𝑡 = −39,… ,−4). Then, for each event, all 
abnormal returns in the event and pre-event windows are standardized:  𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖 , (3) 
where 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖  is the standard deviation of abnormal returns in the pre-event window. This 
procedure ensures comparability of abnormal returns computed on the basis of data from days 
with high or low volatility.  
In order to account for any event-induced increase in volatility observed in the event 
window (Corrado, 2011; Corrado and Truong, 2008; Kolari, Pynnönen, 2011) we re-
standardize the 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡s in the event window for 𝑡 > 0 by dividing them by the cross-sectional 
standard deviation: 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡′ =  𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 𝑡 = −39,… ,0𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡/𝑆𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑡 𝑡 = 1,… ,12,   (4) 
where  
 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑡 =  1𝑁 − 1  𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡        2𝑁𝑖=1  (5) 
is the cross-sectional standard deviation of standardized abnormal returns, and 𝑁  is the 
number of events in the cluster. Under the null hypothesis of no news effect, 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡′ s are zero 
mean and unit variance random variables. 
To study the impact of a news release we test the significance of abnormal returns for 
each 𝑡0  in the event window separately. Thus for each 𝑡0 = −3,… ,12  the demeaned 
standardized abnormal ranks of 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡′ s are given by the formula: 𝑈𝑖𝑡 = 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡′  𝑇 + 1 − 1/2 (6) 
for 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑁, where 𝑡 ∈ 𝛩 = {−39,… ,−4, 𝑡0}, 𝑇 − 1 is the length of the pre-event window 
and 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡′   denotes the rank of 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡′  within the vector consisting of standardized 
abnormal returns from the pre-event window and 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡0′ . With this notation 𝑈𝑖𝑡0  denotes the 
demeaned standardized abnormal rank of 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡0′  and the null hypothesis of no news effect is 
equivalent to 𝐸 𝑈𝑖𝑡0 = 0. (7) 
To test this hypothesis we apply the generalized rank 𝑡𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘  test statistic of Kolari-Pynnönen 
(2011) defined as: 
𝑡𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘 = 𝑍 𝑇 − 2𝑇 − 1 − 𝑍2, (8) 
where 𝑍 = 𝑈 𝑡0/𝑆𝑈 , 𝑆𝑈 =  1𝑇  𝑈 𝑡2𝑡∈Θ  and 𝑈 𝑡 = 1𝑁  𝑈𝑖𝑡𝑁𝑖=1 . 
Under the null hypothesis of no news effect, the distribution of 𝑡𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘  statistic converges to 
Student t distribution with 𝑇 − 2 degrees of freedom when the number of events 𝑁 in the 
cluster increases. 
It is worth emphasizing here that due to standardization (3) the application of the 
above procedure to standardized returns defined in Section 3.2 instead of returns gives the 
same value of test statistic 𝑡𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘 .  
 In order to verify the cumulative impact of news announcements we test the 
significance of cumulative abnormal returns. For a given period 𝜏 the cumulative abnormal 
return is defined as 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝜏 =  𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡𝜏𝑡=1 . (9) 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝜏  describes the cumulative abnormal behavior of returns in the first 𝜏 periods just after 
the 𝑖-th event. The corresponding standardized cumulative abnormal return 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝜏  is given 
by  𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝜏 = 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝜏 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝜏 , (10) 
where 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅 𝑖𝜏 =  𝜏𝑆𝐴𝑅 𝑖. 
As above, 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝜏  are re-standardized: 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝜏′ = 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝜏𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝜏 , (11) 
where 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝜏 is the cross-sectional standard deviation of 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝜏s. Finally, to compare 
abnormal returns in the pre-event window and cumulative abnormal return over the 𝜏-period 
horizon we define generalized abnormal returns as 𝐺𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 𝑡 = −39,… ,0𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝜏′ 𝑡 > 0.   (12) 
To test the null hypothesis of no cumulative effect of US macroeconomic news 
announcements we apply 𝑡𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘  statistic (8) with 𝑈𝑖𝑡  defined on the basis of 𝐺𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡s instead 
of 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡′ s. 
4. Empirical results 
In the first step of the analysis we study the reaction of 5-minute returns over the 
whole period 2006-2020. This will provide a background for further, more detailed 
examination and comparisons. First we will show detailed results of the analysis based on 5-
minute returns of EBS whose shares are the most liquid in our sample. Then we will 
summarize the results for the other companies under consideration. 
4.1. EBS 
Bad news 
Because the most important thing is the reaction of stock prices just before and just 
after news announcements, in Tables 3 and 4 we present the results of the event study not in 
 the whole event window (𝑡 = −3,… ,12), but only for 𝑡 = −3,… ,3. The values presented in 
Table 3 indicate a strong and immediate impact of unexpected bad news from the US 
economy on EBS returns. Significant means of abnormal returns are mainly observed for 𝑡 = 1, i.e. in the first moment when the impact of new information may be noticed. Changes 
of EBS share prices are significant (at least at the 5% level) after announcements of 8 
indicators, namely CCI, DGO, ISM, IJC, NFP, GDP, RS, and cRS. This means that bad news 
from the US economy is quickly incorporated into stock prices. Furthermore, means of 𝐴𝑆𝑅1 
are mainly significant at the 1% level. On the other hand, for the other moments of the event 
window only significance at the 5% or 10% level is observed. What is also important, in each 
significant case for 𝑡 = 1  the average 𝐴𝑆𝑅      𝑡  is negative, what confirms that these 
announcements are seen by investors as bad news. This is in line with our definition of bad 
news.  
A comparison of the averages of 𝐴𝑆𝑅1  shows that the strongest changes of EBS 
returns are implied by bad news from the labor market (NFP) and bad news about 
manufacturing (ISM). It should be noted here that both NFP and ISM are released at the 
beginning of a month 9 . On average, in the first five minutes after news is released 
announcements of NFP or ISM values smaller than expected result in an additional drop in 
returns of EBS of about 80% of their standard deviation. These relative values correspond to 
real additional changes in stock prices of about 0.16% and -0.19% in first five minutes after 
ISM and NFP announcements, respectively. 
When we compare the results of the analysis for 𝑡 = 1 with the other 𝑡 from the event 
window we observe that the impact of macroeconomic news announcements is mainly 
restricted to the first five minutes after news release. The means of 𝐴𝑆𝑅𝑡  for 𝑡 > 1  are 
significant only in a few cases and there is no visible pattern in them. Some values of 
significant 𝐴𝑆𝑅      𝑡  are positive (which suggests that earlier negative changes have been 
corrected) while the others are negative (suggesting continuation). Such a continuation of a 
significant reaction just after news is released is observed in the case of bad news about the 
whole economy included in GDP announcements, where the mean of 𝐴𝑆𝑅2  is also 
significantly negative. 
 
                                                          
9
 ISM is announced on the first working day, while NFP is announced on first Friday of the month. 
 Table 3. Average abnormal standardized 5-minute returns of EBS in a part of event window. 
Bad news from the US economy 
 𝐴𝑆𝑅      𝑡  𝐶𝐴𝑆𝑅       𝑡  
  𝑡 = −2 𝑡 = −1 𝑡 = 0 𝑡 = 1 𝑡 = 2 𝑡 = 3 𝑡 = 4 𝑡 = 8 𝑡 = 12 
CCI (79) -0.04 -0.15 -0.08 -0.53*** -0.15 0.16 -0.58*** -0.45* -0.68* 
CPI (39) 0.10 0.05 0.11 -0.17 0.25* -0.16 0.01 0.15 0.75 
cCPI (41) 0.25 0.01 0.29* -0.13 0.17 -0.11 -0.12 -0.25 0.38 
DGO (81) 0.04 0.00 0.12 -0.35*** 0.12 0.10 -0.16 -0.12 -0.10 
EHS (80) -0.20* -0.04 -0.08 -0.31* -0.19 0.07 -0.32 -0.12 -0.24 
HS (93) -0.06 0.06 0.12 -0.19 0.14* 0.26** 0.06 0.20 0.58* 
IP (74) -0.01 0.03 0.04 -0.12 -0.08 0.14 -0.05 0.04 -0.27 
ISM (67) 0.03 -0.02 -0.05 -0.84*** -0.16 0.12 -1.09*** -1.58*** -1.75*** 
IJC (337) -0.05 0.03 -0.05 -0.20*** -0.04 -0.03 -0.29*** -0.32** -0.22* 
LI (64) 0.02 0.03 -0.05 -0.18 0.03 -0.13 -0.28 -0.64* -0.72** 
NHS (80) -0.19** 0.11 0.05 -0.18 0.04 0.08 -0.04 -0.03 0.22 
NFP (85) 0.19 -0.06 0.10 -0.92*** -0.07 0.28 -1.02*** -1.08* -1.18* 
PI (68) 0.15 0.02 0.02 0.12 0.04 0.16 0.28 0.71 0.94 
PFBOS (82) -0.12* 0.01 -0.02 -0.16 -0.06 0.08 -0.17 0.04 0.11 
PPI (76) 0.06 0.05 -0.18* -0.10 -0.07 0.05 -0.20 0.25 0.28 
cPPI (72) 0.13 0.11 -0.06 -0.06 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.34 0.38 
GDP (68) 0.05 -0.15 0.10 -0.35*** -0.27* 0.07 -0.53** -0.44 -0.69 
RS (85) -0.01 0.06 -0.09 -0.43** 0.02 0.24 -0.29 -0.08 0.20 
cRS (84) -0.08 0.07 -0.09 -0.44*** -0.08 0.11 -0.58** -0.23 0.03 
All (1035) -0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.33*** -0.06 0.07 -0.36*** -0.36*** -0.35*** 
All without 
IJC (940) -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.33
***
 -0.04 0.11** -0.32*** -0.28*** -0.28** 
Notes: *, **, *** – indicates significance of expected value of 𝐴𝑆𝑅𝑡  at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
In order to study the cumulative impact of US macroeconomic news announcements 
on prices of EBS shares we applied the Kolari-Pynnönen test to cumulative abnormal 
standardized returns 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝑅𝑡 . The results of this test for 𝑡 = 4,8,12 describing the cumulative 
impact of US data after 20, 40, and 60 minutes are reported in the three last columns of Table 
3. Comparison of the distributions of 𝐴𝑆𝑅1 and 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝑅𝑡  shows that a significant change just 
after news announcements is rarely strong enough to have a cumulative impact over a longer 
period. After one hour only bad news about ISM has a significant impact at the 1% and about 
LI at the 5% level. In the case of the other indicators this impact becomes insignificant. An 
 analysis of 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝑅       𝑡  for 𝑡 > 1  provides valuable information about the impact of 
macroeconomic news. To compare the cumulative impact of macroeconomic indicators under 
consideration on the prices of EBS Figure 2 shows values of 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝑅       𝑡  for six of them in a one-
hour period after the news release. Figure 2 confirms that the strongest changes take place just 
after news announcements. After some indicators (GDP, CCI, IJC, LI, NFP) the majority of 
changes is observed only in the first five minutes. After this time values of 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝑅       𝑡  stabilize. 
On the other hand, in the case of ISM permanent changes of 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝑅       𝑡   are observed in the event 
window after announcements. This shows the difference in the way new information about 
different indicators impacts the prices of EBS shares.  
 
 
Figure 2. 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝑅       𝑡  values after bad news contained in selected indicators. 
 
Good news 
Changes in the prices of EBS shares after good news from the US economy are similar 
to those observed after bad news. They are mainly significant just after news releases and this 
is a significance at the 1% level. Significant (at least at the 5% level) means of abnormal 
returns of EBS are observed in the first period after announcements of 13 indicators. Only 
information about inflation (CPI, cCPI, PPI, cPPI), Leading Indicator (LI), and Personal 
Incomes (PI) is insignificant. Later in the event window, the means of 𝐴𝑆𝑅𝑡  are significant 
only at the 5% or 10% level. Values of 𝐴𝑆𝑅      𝑡  for 𝑡 = 1  are also the highest among the 
averages for positive 𝑡. This once again indicates that prices of EBS shares react immediately 
and significantly to US macroeconomic news. The strongest reaction is implied by good news 
from the labor market. After the publication of NFP values greater than the expected prices of 
EBS shares jump by about 170% of the standard deviation of 5-minute returns in the first five 
 minutes. Other announcements that also strongly impact prices are, for example, GDP, ISM, 
and RS. As we can observe in Table 4 the magnitude of abnormal standardized returns in the 
later periods (for 𝑡 > 1) is much smaller than just after the release of news .  
 
Table 4. Average abnormal standardized 5-minute returns of EBS in a part of event window. 
Good news from the US economy 
 𝐴𝑆𝑅      𝑡  𝐶𝐴𝑆𝑅       𝑡  
  𝑡 = −2 𝑡 = −1 𝑡 = 0 𝑡 = 1 𝑡 = 2 𝑡 = 3 𝑡 = 4 𝑡 = 8 𝑡 = 12 
CCI (87) 0.09 -0.07 0.08 0.51*** 0.07 -0.01 0.51* 0.39 0.57 
CPI (53) 0.05 0.04 -0.06 -0.27 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.28 0.49 
cCPI (60) 0.07 0.11 -0.11 0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.06 0.32 0.47 
DGO (82) 0.13 -0.04 -0.02 0.28** 0.11 -0.06 0.17 0.12 0.04 
EHS (74) 0.20* 0.04 0.03 0.35** 0.12 0.08 0.40 0.71* 0.55 
HS (79) 0.02 0.06 -0.10 0.33*** -0.11 -0.05 0.21** -0.10 0.17 
IP (64) 0.01 0.25* -0.05 0.45*** 0.40** -0.14 0.57 0.82* 0.49 
ISM (79) 0.06 -0.02 0.13 0.80*** -0.01 -0.06 0.73** 1.15*** 0.69 
IJC (357) 0.06* 0.09* 0.04 0.27*** 0.08 0.07** 0.43*** 0.35*** 0.39*** 
LI (73) -0.24** -0.22** 0.05 0.19* -0.13 0.16 0.13 -0.02 0.04 
NHS (74) -0.05 -0.23 0.17* 0.32** -0.22* 0.05 0.00 -0.02 -0.26 
NFP (75) 0.19 -0.01 0.06 1.73*** 0.17 0.15 2.04*** 2.01*** 1.76*** 
PI (59) 0.21 -0.04 0.01 0.12 0.04 0.10 0.13 0.31 0.12 
PFBOS (82) -0.04 0.09 -0.15 0.28** -0.08 -0.06 0.09 0.02 0.15 
PPI (73) 0.02 0.06 0.00 -0.06 -0.05 0.17 -0.06 0.00 -0.05 
cPPI (55) -0.09 0.06 -0.03 -0.11 -0.14 0.30** 0.08 0.30 0.32* 
GDP (60) 0.00 0.03 0.11 0.87*** 0.21 0.00 1.19*** 1.34*** 1.66*** 
RS (69) 0.07** 0.07 -0.01 0.75*** -0.03 -0.05 0.71*** 0.80*** 1.14*** 
cRS (58) 0.13* 0.03 -0.04 0.52*** 0.15 0.01 0.83*** 0.73*** 0.95*** 
All (1014) 0.04** 0.00 0.04* 0.50*** 0.08 0.02 0.59*** 0.60*** 0.58*** 
All without 
IJC (893) 0.04 -0.01 0.02 0.51
***
 0.06 0.02 0.56*** 0.61*** 0.57*** 
Notes: *, **, *** – indicates significance of expected value of 𝐴𝑆𝑅𝑡  at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
A comparison with the results in Table 3 shows that good news from the US economy 
implies more significant changes in stock prices than bad news. Moreover, 𝐴𝑆𝑅      𝑡  values 
indicate that changes caused by good news are stronger than those that follow bad news. 
When we compare the cumulative impact of bad and good news we can see that the later have 
 more significant cases after one hour. The means of 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝑅12  are significant after good news 
concerning IJC, NFP, GDP, RS, and cRS. The strongest changes in stock prices are implied 




Figure 3. 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝑅       𝑡  values after good news contained in selected indicators. 
 
 
Figure 4. 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝑅       𝑡  values after bad and good news announcements. 
 
As in the case of bad news, in Figure 3 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝑅       𝑡  values are presented for indicators 
which lead to significant cumulative changes. As we can observe in Figure 3 the strongest 
changes are in the first five minutes after news announcements. Then, 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝑅       𝑡  are usually on 
the same level or increase very slowly. This means that abnormal returns for 𝑡 > 1 are much 
smaller than for 𝑡 = 1. This pattern was also observed after bad news from the US and this 
can be seen in Figure 4 where we present the 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝑅       𝑡  values after all bad and all good news 
contained in the announcements under consideration. In the first five minutes after good news 
 the prices of EBS shares increase above the trend by about 60% of the  standard deviation of 
returns. The drop after bad news has a smaller magnitude of about 40% of the standard 
deviation of 5-minute returns. After this short period (as in Figure 3) 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝑅       𝑡  values do not 
change much. 
A comparison of the results from Tables 3 and 4 prompts one to pose a question 
regarding the asymmetry of changes implied by US macroeconomic news announcements. In 
order to verify whether good or bad news implies a significantly stronger reaction of investors 
we applied the Kruskal-Wallis test. For each indicator, using this test we compare the 
distribution of 𝐴𝑆𝑅1 after good news and the distribution of – 𝐴𝑆𝑅1  after bad news. If the 
reaction of investors were symmetrical these distributions would not differ significantly. The 
results of the Kruskal-Wallis tests show that significant (at the 5% level) asymmetry of 
abnormal returns is observed only just after announcements of NPF and GDP. In both cases 
the reaction after good news is significantly stronger than the reaction after bad news from the 
US economy. For the other indicators 𝐴𝑆𝑅1 after good news and – 𝐴𝑆𝑅1 after bad news have 
similar distributions.  
Standardized news 
In the above analysis we classified events into clusters based only on the difference 
between the announced value of an indicator and its expectation. In order to verify the impact 
of the strength of new information on the reaction of investors on the VSE we will consider 
standardized news. Like Balduzzi et al. (2001) and Andersen et al. (2003) we divide the 
difference between the announced and expected value of an indicator by the standard 
deviation of these differences. More precisely standardized news included in 𝑖 -th 
announcements of 𝑘-th indicator (𝑆𝑖𝑘) is are given by formula: 𝑆𝑖𝑘 = 𝐴𝑖𝑘 −𝐸𝑖𝑘𝜎 𝑘  
where 𝐴𝑖𝑘 –𝑖-th announced value of 𝑘-th indicator, 𝐸𝑖𝑘- expected value of 𝑖-th announcement of 𝑘-th indicator, 𝜎 𝑘- standard deviation of differences 𝐴𝑖𝑘 −𝐸𝑖𝑘 computed for 𝑘-th indicator.  
In this definition the standard deviation 𝜎 𝑘  is computed on the basis of announcements 
from January 2006 up to March 2020, due to the very volatile behavior of investors caused by 
the COVID-19 pandemic in
 In order to verify the impact of the difference between the announced and expected 
value of indicators we repeated the above analysis taking into account only announcements 
with a very high such difference. More precisely, we consider only announcements with  𝑆𝑖𝑘  > 0.5. The results of this analysis are presented in Tables 5 and 6.  
 
Table 5. Average abnormal standardized 5-minute returns of EBS in a part of event window 
when bad news from the US economy is announced. Cases with  𝑆𝑖𝑘  > 0.5 
 𝐴𝑆𝑅      𝑡  𝐶𝐴𝑆𝑅       𝑡  
  𝑡 = −3 𝑡 = −2 𝑡 = −1 𝑡 = 0 𝑡 = 1 𝑡 = 2 𝑡 = 3 𝑡 = 4 𝑡 = 8 𝑡 = 12 
CCI (33) 0.02 -0.08 -0.08 -0.25* -0.46*** -0.19 0.04 -0.57* -0.37 -0.61 
CPI (39) 0.18 0.10 0.05 0.11 -0.17 0.25* -0.16 0.01 0.15 0.75 
cCPI (41) 0.14 0.25 0.01 0.29* -0.13 0.17 -0.11 -0.12 -0.25 0.38 
DGO (43) -0.08 -0.02 0.00 0.07 -0.70*** 0.03 0.22 -0.51*** -0.32** -0.11 
EHS (27) 0.17 -0.28** 0.16 0.06 -0.53** -0.01 0.22 0.03 -0.03 0.02 
HS (55) -0.01 -0.11 0.10 0.17 -0.34 0.11 0.16 -0.15 -0.01 0.43 
IP (63) 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.07 -0.18 -0.04 0.16 -0.12 -0.07 -0.23 
ISM (23) -0.31** 0.12 -0.22 -0.07 -1.54*** -0.21 0.41*** -1.60*** -1.46 -1.45 
IJC (179) 0.02 -0.04 -0.05* -0.04 -0.44*** -0.14 -0.02 -0.55*** -0.62*** -0.48*** 
LI (18) -0.04 -0.21 0.14 -0.32 -0.50 -0.19 0.16 -0.74 -0.59 -1.07 
NHS (18) 0.14 -0.30* 0.21 0.02 -0.50*** -0.33 0.38 -0.62** -1.07** -1.09* 
NFP (37) -0.20* 0.12 0.05 -0.02 -1.19*** -0.05 0.27 -1.37** -1.89* -2.00 
PI (28) 0.01 0.21 0.14 0.01 0.37 0.00 0.28 0.75 0.94 1.20 
PFBOS (47) -0.06 -0.21** 0.07 0.03 -0.23 -0.09 0.15 -0.07 0.26 0.41 
PPI (40) -0.19* 0.03 0.24 -0.01 -0.29** -0.10 -0.12 -0.49* -0.02 -0.14 
cPPI (43) 0.02 0.02 0.09 -0.12 -0.28 0.28 0.03 -0.09 0.49 0.65 
GDP (37) 0.19* 0.10 -0.27** 0.20 -0.62*** -0.28** 0.08 -0.96*** -0.84 -1.02 
RS (54) -0.01 -0.10 0.07 -0.11 -0.74*** -0.07 0.21 -0.70** -0.44 -0.01 
cRS (47) -0.12 0.03 0.12 -0.20 -0.91*** -0.18 0.06 -1.32*** -0.89** -0.53 
All (631) 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.03* -0.41*** -0.05 0.12*** -0.39*** -0.34*** -0.26*** 
All without 
IJC (532) 0.00 -0.01 0.04 0.03
*
 -0.42*** -0.04 0.15*** -0.38*** -0.24** -0.17* 
Notes: *, **, *** – indicates significance of expected value of 𝐴𝑆𝑅𝑡  at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Restricting the analysis only to very surprising announcements reduces the sample of 
the events under consideration. We should note that this fact might impact the power of the 
Kolari-Pynnönen test. Only in the case of CPI and cCPI announcements is the sample of 
 events  not reduced due to the  very large number of announcements in line with consensus. 
Hence in the comparison of the results in Tables 5 and 6 with the previous results we will not 
mention these indicators. 
In Table 5 we observe that for the majority of indicators under consideration 
restriction of the analysis only to very bad news increases the strength of the impact. For 
almost all the indicators values of 𝐴𝑆𝑅      1 are smaller than in Table 3. The only exceptions are 
announcements of CCI and PI, but in these cases both averages (for all announcements and in 
the restricted sample) are insignificant. The strongest changes in EBS returns are caused this 
time by bad news regarding ISM. Restricting the analysis increases the number of cases with 
a significant average of abnormal returns. In Table 5 a significant impact at least at the 5% 
level is observed after three additional macroeconomic indicators: EHS, NHS, and PPI. 
However, restricting the analysis leads to a very strong reduction in the sample of events: 
from 80 to 27 for EHS and from 80 to 18 for NHS.  
 
 
Figure 5. Box-plots of distribution of 𝐴𝑆𝑅𝑡  for all unexpected bad news (―all‖) and for 
announcements with  𝑆𝑖𝑘  > 0.5 (―restricted‖). 
 
In order to verify whether announcements of very bad news lead to significantly 
stronger changes in EBS returns than in the case of the whole sample of bad news we 
performed a bootstrap analysis. For each indicator, from the whole sample of 𝐴𝑆𝑅1 for bad 
news we randomly generated 1000 subsamples of a length equal to the number of very bad 
news. Then we computed the percentage of averages 𝐴𝑆𝑅      1 smaller than the average for very 
bad news only. This bootstrap procedure shows that the restriction of the analysis only to very 
 bad news gives a significantly stronger reaction (at the 5% level) only after announcements of 
EHS, ISM, IJC, and cRS. In the case of the other macroeconomic indicators the average 𝐴𝑆𝑅      1 
after very bad news does not differ from the other averages computed on the basis of sets of 
abnormal standardized returns of the same length. 
 
Table 6. Average abnormal standardized 5-minute returns of EBS in a part of event window. 
Good news from the US economy 
 𝐴𝑆𝑅      𝑡  𝐶𝐴𝑆𝑅       𝑡  
  𝑡 = −3 𝑡 = −2 𝑡 = −1 𝑡 = 0 𝑡 = 1 𝑡 = 2 𝑡 = 3 𝑡 = 4 𝑡 = 8 𝑡 = 12 
CCI (42) -0.27** 0.27* 0.06 -0.01 0.28*** 0.12 -0.06 0.31 0.37 0.59 
CPI (53) -0.06 0.05 0.04 -0.06 -0.27 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.28 0.49 
cCPI (60) -0.14* 0.07 0.11 -0.11 0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.06 0.32 0.47 
DGO (38) -0.06 0.10 -0.21 0.10 0.17 0.18 -0.18 -0.02 0.05 -0.21 
EHS (27) 0.17 0.20 -0.06 0.02 0.37 -0.25 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.18 
HS (39) -0.05 0.14* 0.19 -0.22 0.42 -0.16 -0.01 0.49*** 0.07 0.15 
IP (44) 0.22 0.01 0.22* -0.19 0.34** 0.46 -0.16 0.48 0.63 0.07 
ISM (36) -0.06 0.22 -0.12 0.07 0.67*** 0.10** 0.12 0.75* 1.24** 1.36* 
IJC (178) 0.00 0.12* 0.12** 0.05 0.36*** -0.01 0.09 0.42*** 0.32** 0.49*** 
LI (36) -0.06 -0.31 -0.18 -0.03 0.12*** 0.16 0.09* 0.16 -0.16 -0.05 
NHS (23) 0.04 0.03 -0.17 -0.03 0.25 -0.54*** -0.01 -0.31* -0.52* -0.75 
NFP (25) -0.01 0.28* 0.11 -0.14 2.32*** 0.51* 0.25 2.97*** 2.80*** 2.41*** 
PI (28) 0.02 0.05 -0.29 -0.05 0.26 0.24 -0.18 0.00 -0.13 -0.60 
PFBOS (48) 0.01 -0.15 0.25* -0.28** 0.34* -0.01 0.03 0.30 0.19 0.23 
PPI (44) -0.15 0.01 0.15 -0.02 -0.03 -0.12 0.26 -0.07 -0.07 -0.19 
cPPI (32) 0.07 0.04 0.13 0.10 -0.12 -0.14 0.32 0.09 0.18 0.40 
GDP (32) -0.01 -0.12 -0.01 0.09 1.25*** 0.16 -0.02 1.30*** 1.51** 1.58*** 
RS (39) 0.19* -0.03 0.10 0.01 0.65*** 0.01 -0.12 0.68*** 0.73** 1.25*** 
cRS (28) 0.16 0.08 0.03 -0.21 0.75*** 0.12 -0.12 0.91*** 0.64 0.81* 
All (621) -0.01 0.07** 0.04 -0.01 0.46*** 0.10 0.03 0.55*** 0.53*** 0.58*** 
All without 
IJC (520) -0.03 0.06
**
 0.01 -0.06 0.46*** 0.11 0.02 0.54*** 0.56*** 0.57*** 
Notes: *, **, *** – indicates significance of expected value of 𝐴𝑆𝑅𝑡  at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Restriction of the analysis also changes the results of cumulated impact, but the 
conclusions are mixed. For the majority of cases the 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝑅       12  values in Table 5 are lower than 
the respective values in Table 3. This indicates a stronger impact of news under consideration 
 over the longer period. However, in Table 5 there is only one case with a significant average 
of cumulated abnormal returns (IJC), whereas in Table 3 there are two such cases (IJC and 
LI). The box-plots presented in Figure 5 allow a more precise comparison of the distribution 
of 𝑆𝐴𝑅1 with and without the restriction. 
In the case of good news the results of the analysis of the restricted sample are the 
opposite. For 8 indicators (CCI, DGO, IP, ISM, LI, NHS, cPPI, and RS) the 𝐴𝑆𝑅      𝑡  values in 
Table 6 are smaller than in Table 4, indicating a weaker impact of news announcements. 
Furthermore, restricting the analysis reduces the number of significant changes in the first five 
minutes after news announcements from 13 to 9. Insignificant 𝐴𝑆𝑅1  averages are now 
observed after DGO, EHS, NHS, and PFBOS. However, the reduction of the sample also 
should be taken into account. For example, in the case of EHS the number of events under 
consideration decreases from 74 to 27, for NHS from 74 to 23. On the other hand, the number 
of NFP announcements reduces from 75 to 25, but the average remains significant. 
Differences between distributions of 𝐴𝑆𝑅1 for the whole sample and for very good news only 
are presented in Figure 6. A bootstrap analysis performed analogously, as in the case of very 
bad news, confirms the above results. For all indicators under consideration the average 𝐴𝑆𝑅      𝑡  
after very good news is insignificant when compared to the averages computed on the basis of 
other good news. 
 
 
Figure 6. Box-plots of distribution of 𝐴𝑆𝑅𝑡  for all unexpected good news (―all‖) and for 
announcements with  𝑆𝑖𝑘  > 0.5 (―restricted‖). 
 
 Restricting the sample also impacts the results obtained for cumulated abnormal 
returns. For the whole sample one hour after news announcements 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝑅       12  are significant for 
IJC, NFP, GDP, RS, cRS, but when the analysis is performed only for very good news the 
changes after cRS become insignificant. Additionally, the reduction leads to smaller 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝑅       12  
values after GP and cRS announcements. However, after the other indicators we observe 
higher average values. The highest𝐶𝐴𝑆𝑅       12  value follows very bad news from the labor 
market included in NFP announcements (the average increases from 1.76 to 2.41).  
Changes in reaction strength 
The main part of the empirical study in this paper concerns changes in the strength of 
the investors‘ reaction to US macroeconomic news over the last 15 years. To do this, we 
compare results of an event study analysis carried out in various subperiods. These subperiods 
should be long enough to include a suitable number of macroeconomic announcements. On 
the other hand, it is better to take the shortest possible subperiods into account because this 
gives more accurate results. Finally, as a compromise, we perform event study analysis in 1-, 
2-, 4-, and 5-year windows shifted every quarter. The first of such windows begins in January 
2006, while the last one ends in June 2020. The procedure described above is flexible enough 
to give us an appropriate description of changes in EBS returns in the reaction to US 
macroeconomic news announcements.  
 
Figure 7. Averages of modified abnormal standardized returns (𝑀𝐴𝑆𝑅        1) of EBS over various 
windows  
Notes: Modified abnormal standardized returns 𝑀𝐴𝑆𝑅1 are equal to 𝐴𝑆𝑅1 after good news announcements and are equal to −𝐴𝑆𝑅1 after bad news announcements. Averages (𝑀𝐴𝑆𝑅        1) of abnormal standardized returns of EBS in the first five minutes 
after US macroeconomic news announcements were computed in windows of various lengths. Each window was shifted 
every three months to cover the whole period 2006-2020. On the X axis we marked the centers of the windows.  
 
 In general, the analysis presented in the previous subsections shows that changes after 
bad and good news from the US are of almost the same magnitude and asymmetry occurs 
only after two indicators. Hence, to increase the number of events in the windows we take 
both types of unexpected news into account together. To do this, as in the analysis of 
asymmetry, we multiply abnormal returns corresponding to bad news by -1. As a result, all 
abnormal returns modified in this way (𝑀𝐴𝑆𝑅𝑡 ) should move in one direction after news 




Figure 8. Averages of modified abnormal standardized returns (𝑀𝐴𝑆𝑅        1) of EBS over various 
windows after IJC announcements  
Notes: Modified abnormal standardized returns 𝑀𝐴𝑆𝑅1 are equal to 𝐴𝑆𝑅1 after good news announcements and are equal to −𝐴𝑆𝑅1 after bad news announcements. Averages (𝑀𝐴𝑆𝑅        1) of abnormal standardized returns of EBS in the first five minutes 
after US macroeconomic news announcements were computed in windows of various lengths. Each window was shifted 
every three months to cover the whole period 2006-2020. On the X axis we marked the centers of the windows. 
 
The results of these event study analyses in subperiods are summarized in Figure 7 
where we present the  𝑀𝐴𝑆𝑅        1 averages of modified abnormal standardized returns computed 
for all announcements in each window. As we observe from Figure 7 the strength of changes 
in EBS share prices implied by US macroeconomic news announcements varies over the 
period under consideration. The highest values of 𝑀𝐴𝑆𝑅        1 occur in the period just after the 
global financial crisis 2007-2009 and they are very close to one standard deviation of 5-
minute returns. Then, since 2010-2011 the reaction of investors just after unexpected news 
from the US economy has weakened. However, at the end of the period decreasing trend of 
the averages inverses. This indicates increased importance of information from the US. In 
addition to the value of the average its significance matters. In general, averages  𝑀𝐴𝑆𝑅        1 are 
 significant at least at the 5% level in almost all subperiods. There are some cases of 
insignificance around 2017, but they occur mainly when the analysis is performed in 1-year 
windows. Since then the impact of announcements under consideration has again been  
significant. 
Changes in the magnitude of average abnormal returns are observed not only when all 
announcements are considered jointly, but also for each indicator separately. As an example, 
in Figure 8 we present 𝑀𝐴𝑆𝑅        1values after IJC announcements. The pattern for the other 
indicators is similar, but due to the smaller number of events the analysis must be performed 
only in 4- or 5-year windows.  
An analysis of the cumulated values of modified abnormal standardized returns 
provides us with another valuable piece of information about changes in the strength of 
investors‘ reactions on the VSE to US macroeconomic news announcements. More precisely, 
we sort all the announcements relative to time from the oldest to the newest. Then we 
cumulate the corresponding values of modified abnormal standardized returns 𝑀𝐴𝑆𝑅1  just 
after these announcements. For a given time 𝑡 between January 1, 2006 and June 31, 2020 the 
value of cumulated modified abnormal standardized returns 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑆𝑅𝑡  equals the sum of 𝑀𝐴𝑆𝑅1 for all announcements of unexpected US macroeconomic news between January 1, 
2006 and time 𝑡 . If the reaction of investors is in line with the difference between the 
announced and expected value of an indicator, the value of 𝑀𝐴𝑆𝑅1 should be positive for 
good, as well as for bad news. Hence, we expect values 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑆𝑅𝑡  to grow (see Figure 9). The 
slope of the 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑆𝑅𝑡  graph depends on the strength with which the new information affects 
prices of EBS shares. When announcements imply greater changes in stock prices 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑆𝑅𝑡  
values grow faster and the slope of the graph increases. On the other hand, when the impact of 
news weakens, the slope decreases and the graph flattens out. The main advantage of 
analyzing 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑆𝑅𝑡  rather than 𝑀𝐴𝑆𝑅        1 values is their flexibility. Using 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑆𝑅𝑡  we are able 
to analyze all the announcements one by one and identify changes in their slope. In Figure 9 
we can distinguish three main parts of the graph. They are approximately marked by vertical 
dashed lines. In the first part the graph is almost horizontal. This means that changes in EBS 
returns just after US news announcements are very small or 𝑀𝐴𝑆𝑅𝑡  values are canceled out. 
Then, at the end of 2006, 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑆𝑅𝑡  values start to rise. In the figure we highlighted October 
2006 because the first signs of a housing crisis in the US appeared in the third quarter of 
2006; property prices stopped rising and the speculative bubble on the real estate market 
burst. The very steep slope of the graph is especially visible from January to April 2007. Then 
 the graph is almost vertical until August 2007. Since then we have observed an increased 
impact of US macroeconomic news on EBS prices. This period lasts until at least 2013. After 
that the importance of these messages gradually decreases. As an example, in Figure 9 we 
marked September 2013 when the Fed decided to hold off on scaling back its bond-buying 
program. Additionally, in 2013 US stock market indices returned to the level from before the 
crisis. This was one of the results of the bull market observed in 2013 all around the world. 
For example, S&P500 increased about 30%, DAX – 25%, FTSE100 – 18%, NIKKEI – 57%. 
 
Figure 9. Values of cumulated modified abnormal standardized returns 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑆𝑅𝑡  of EBS.  
Notes: For a given time 𝑡 between January 1, 2006 and June 31, 2020 the value of cumulated modified abnormal 
standardized returns 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑆𝑅𝑡  equals the sum of 𝑀𝐴𝑆𝑅1 for all announcements of unexpected US macroeconomic news 
between January 1, 2006 and time 𝑡. Modified abnormal standardized returns 𝑀𝐴𝑆𝑅1 are equal to 𝐴𝑆𝑅1 after good news 
announcements and are equal to −𝐴𝑆𝑅1 after bad news announcements. 
 
4.2. Other companies form the ATX  
Tables 7 and 8 present values of mean abnormal standardized returns 𝐴𝑆𝑅¯ 𝑡 computed 
for the first 5-minute period just after news announcements for bad (Table 7) or good (Table 
8) unexpected news included in announcements of US macroeconomic indicators described in 
Section 3.1. Together with the values of 𝐴𝑆𝑅      𝑡  we the report results of the Kolari-Pynnönen 
generalized rank test. In addition to means for single indicators, in Table 7 and 8 we present 
results of the event study analysis for all bad and all good news (rows ―All‖ and ―All without 
IJC). 
Results in Table 7 and 8 show a strong and significant reaction of stock prices of the 
largest companies listed on the VSE to macroeconomic news announcements. However, the 
strength of the change and its significance depends on both stock and announced indicator. 
 In the case of bad news the largest number of significant changes (at least at the 5% 
level) is observed after announcements of ISM (10 stocks), NFP (9 stocks), cRS (9), and CCI 
(8 cases). On the other hand, announcements of unexpected bad news contained in the value 
of PFBOS and HS imply no significant changes in the prices of stocks under consideration. 
When we take the reaction of individual stocks into account we can also see 
differences in the number of significant reactions. The largest number of significant changes 
implied by US macroeconomic news announcements is observed in the case of WIE (after 11 
indicators), TKA, RBI, VER, and VOE. On the other hand, only one such change is observed 
in the case of EVN (after LI) and MMK (after NHS) 5-minute returns. 
The strongest reaction of stock prices (measured by the value of 𝐴𝑆𝑅      1) is in general 
implied by bad news from the labor market. The highest values of 𝐴𝑆𝑅      1 (in absolute value) 
are observed after NFP announcements: -0.92 for EBS and -0.84 for RBI. Besides that, a very 
strong reaction is observed in the prices of EBS after bad news contained in ISM (𝐴𝑆𝑅      1 ≈−0.84). These 𝐴𝑆𝑅      1 values mean that after bad news 5-minute returns drop additionally up to 
about 80% of their standard deviation.  
The values of 𝐴𝑆𝑅      1 in two last rows of Table 7 give general information about the 
strength of the reaction of the stock prices of each company to bad news from the US 
economy. The lowest 𝐴𝑆𝑅      1 values (and the strongest reaction) is observed in the case of EBS, 
RBI, and VOE. A comparison with values from Table 2 indicates that they are also the most 
heavily traded stocks. 
An analysis of the results in Table 8 leads to similar results. The largest number of 
significant changes is observed after unexpected good news included in the announcements of 
ISM (for 11 stocks), NFP (11), GDP (10), and CCI (9) announcements. Three of these 
indicators (ISM, NFP, and CCI) were also mentioned when impact of bad news was analyzed. 
In contrast to Table 7 insignificant changes are observed after good news regarding LI and 
CPI. When we take changes in the stock prices of an individual company  into account we 
observe that, as before, a very high number of significant means of abnormal returns is 
observed for WIE, VOE, and RBI. However, the largest number of significant averages of 𝐴𝑆𝑅1 after good news is in the case of EBS. At the other extreme are prices of EVN, SBO, 
and TKA, where only 3-4 significant changes occur. 
 
 Table 7. Average abnormal standardized returns in the first five minutes after bad news from the US economy 
 ANDR EBS EVN MMK OMV POST RBI SBO TKA VER VIG VOE WIE 
CCI(79) -0.54** -0.53*** -0.17 -0.07 -0.46*** 0.10 -0.81*** 0.00 -0.26** -0.27** -0.15* -0.71*** -0.56*** 
CPI(39) -0.06 -0.17 0.04 0.15 -0.33 -0.10 -0.14 -0.33** -0.17 -0.48*** -0.15 -0.33* -0.63** 
cCPI(41) -0.17 -0.13 -0.03 0.06 -0.51** -0.13 -0.35** -0.37* -0.05 -0.37** -0.33 -0.32 -0.51** 
DGO(81) -0.06 -0.35*** 0.14* -0.07 -0.24 -0.14** -0.11 0.01 -0.21** -0.14 -0.46*** -0.19* -0.23*** 
EHS(80) -0.28** -0.31* -0.05 0.08 -0.56*** -0.19*** -0.39*** -0.06 -0.46*** -0.01 -0.09 -0.40** -0.17 
HS(93) 0.10 -0.19 0.04 -0.01 -0.10 -0.08 0.06 -0.11 -0.05 -0.11 -0.15* -0.02 -0.17 
IP(74) -0.29* -0.12 0.03 -0.07 -0.34*** -0.03 -0.24* -0.17* 0.00 -0.21 -0.25** -0.37*** -0.21** 
ISM(67) -0.68*** -0.84*** 0.04 0.00 -0.65*** -0.13 -0.46*** -0.39*** -0.45*** -0.47*** -0.31** -0.57*** -0.32** 
IJC(337) -0.17*** -0.20*** 0.01 -0.08 -0.05 -0.08* -0.13** -0.09* -0.11*** -0.16** -0.05** -0.14** -0.02 
LI(64) -0.11 -0.18 0.31** 0.06 0.00 -0.22* -0.13 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.19 0.21* -0.12 
NHS(80) 0.00 -0.18 -0.07 -0.15** 0.01 -0.23*** -0.17 -0.02 0.07 -0.07 -0.09 -0.19** -0.28*** 
NFP(85) -0.49*** -0.92*** -0.18 -0.09 -0.52*** -0.19 -0.84*** -0.33** -0.31** -0.49*** -0.57*** -0.56* -0.80*** 
PI(68) 0.05 0.12 -0.23 -0.02 0.11 0.10 0.18 0.13 0.05 0.34*** 0.09 0.12 0.10 
PFBOS(82) -0.11 -0.16 -0.13 -0.13 -0.03 -0.05 0.01 -0.01 -0.12 -0.06 -0.05 -0.07 0.03 
PPI(76) 0.04 -0.10 -0.04 -0.08 -0.11 0.13 -0.06* 0.03 -0.25** -0.14 -0.12 0.00 -0.22** 
cPPI(72) -0.02 -0.06 -0.03 -0.13* -0.10 0.00 0.06 -0.22 -0.18** -0.15* 0.00 -0.04 -0.10 
GDP(68) -0.34*** -0.35*** -0.09 -0.04 -0.30* -0.02 -0.45*** -0.28 -0.34*** -0.28** -0.40*** -0.50** -0.18 
RS(85) -0.22 -0.43** 0.01 -0.08 -0.08 -0.28 -0.38** -0.39*** -0.10** -0.14* -0.44*** -0.45*** -0.40*** 
cRS(84) -0.29 -0.44*** -0.03 0.02 -0.18** -0.32** -0.36** -0.34*** 0.01 -0.32*** -0.41*** -0.47*** -0.34*** 
All(1035) -0.25*** -0.33*** 0.01 -0.06** -0.23*** -0.08** -0.30*** -0.13*** -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.21*** -0.31*** -0.26*** 
All without IJC(940) -0.24*** -0.33*** -0.01 -0.05* -0.26*** -0.08** -0.32*** -0.12*** -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.26*** -0.31*** -0.28*** 
Notes: *, **, *** – indicates significance of expected value of 𝐴𝑆𝑅𝑡  at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 Table 8. Mean abnormal standardized returns in first five minutes after good news from the US economy 
  ANDR EBS EVN MMK OMV POST RBI SBO TKA VER VIG VOE WIE 
CCI(87) 0.45*** 0.51*** 0.03 -0.13* 0.32** 0.22*** 0.33*** 0.09 0.02 0.22*** 0.25*** 0.33** 0.41*** 
CPI(53) -0.06 -0.27 0.01 -0.06 0.12 -0.20 0.06 -0.28 0.01 0.25* -0.11* -0.02 0.05 
cCPI(60) 0.18 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 0.20 0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.19 0.11 -0.11 0.21** 0.17*** 
DGO(82) 0.06 0.28** 0.15** 0.00 -0.09 0.00 0.08 -0.08 0.15 0.15* 0.16** 0.19 0.05 
EHS(74) 0.32** 0.35** 0.06 0.04 0.17 0.25*** 0.23** 0.01 0.22 0.06 0.19** 0.56*** 0.29** 
HS(79) 0.27** 0.33*** -0.04 -0.01 0.11 0.10 0.36 -0.15 0.04 -0.09 0.13** 0.02 0.18 
IP(64) 0.04 0.45*** 0.04 0.09** 0.15 0.16 0.33 0.25 0.23 0.24* 0.18* 0.42*** 0.17 
ISM(79) 0.42*** 0.80*** 0.07 0.28*** 0.66*** 0.17 0.77*** 0.57*** 0.43*** 0.26** 0.39** 0.87*** 0.60*** 
IJC(357) 0.19*** 0.27*** 0.01 -0.10 0.15*** 0.04 0.22*** 0.04 0.04 0.27*** 0.00 0.24*** 0.18*** 
LI(73) 0.21* 0.19* 0.13* 0.20* -0.10 0.11 0.11 0.16 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.22* 0.06 
NHS(74) 0.18 0.32** -0.04 0.01 0.45*** 0.23*** 0.38* -0.02 0.12 0.09 0.29 0.19 0.53*** 
NFP(75) 0.84*** 1.73*** 0.09 0.03 0.94*** 0.51*** 1.22*** 0.72*** 0.77*** 0.57*** 0.98*** 1.35*** 0.92*** 
PI(59) 0.01 0.12 0.13 0.17*** 0.03 0.07 0.15 -0.01 -0.04 0.03 0.08 -0.02 0.16** 
PFBOS(82) 0.00 0.28** 0.00 0.24** 0.11* -0.08 0.24** 0.04 0.02 -0.04 -0.03 0.37*** 0.12 
PPI(73) -0.18 -0.06 -0.13 -0.13 -0.18 -0.41* -0.25*** -0.49*** -0.13** -0.14** -0.19 -0.07 -0.11* 
cPPI(55) -0.12 -0.11 -0.16** 0.01 -0.15 -0.47*** -0.29** -0.40*** 0.00 -0.17* -0.06 -0.02 -0.21** 
GDP(60) 0.40*** 0.87*** -0.23*** 0.20** 0.32** 0.11 0.65*** 0.00 0.34*** -0.07 0.30** 0.54*** 0.46** 
RS(69) 0.33*** 0.75*** 0.14 0.11 0.24 -0.23 0.63*** -0.15 0.11 0.22* 0.34*** 0.51*** 0.29** 
cRS(58) 0.30*** 0.52*** 0.20 0.05 0.34** -0.16 0.55*** -0.05 0.01 0.31** 0.25 0.56*** 0.32*** 
All(1014) 0.29*** 0.50*** 0.06* 0.05*** 0.27*** 0.13*** 0.38*** 0.10*** 0.18*** 0.24*** 0.22*** 0.41*** 0.30*** 
All without IJC(893) 0.27*** 0.51*** 0.04 0.10*** 0.29*** 0.11*** 0.39*** 0.10** 0.20*** 0.16*** 0.24*** 0.43*** 0.31*** 
Notes: *, **, *** – indicates significance of expected value of 𝐴𝑆𝑅𝑡  at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 Similarly to bad news, the strongest reaction of investors on the VSE is caused by the 
announcements of NFP.  𝐴𝑆𝑅      1 is about 1.73 for EBS, 1.33 for VOE, and 1.22 for RBI. These 
values are much higher in absolute value than the respective 𝐴𝑆𝑅      1  after bad news. This 
indicates the possibility of asymmetry in the reaction to US macroeconomic news 
announcements. However, a simple comparison of absolute values of the averages 𝐴𝑆𝑅      1 
shows that good news from the US economy leads to a stronger reaction of stock prices only 
in about 55% of cases. Hence, the Kruskal-Wallis test was used for formal verification. Its 
results are reported in Table 9. Significant asymmetry can only be noticed  in a few cases. The 
largest number of asymmetric reactions occurs after announcements of cPPI, NFP, PI, and 
PPI. Comparison of the results in Tables 7-9 indicates that asymmetry is usually only 
observed when changes following one type of news (bad or good) are significant. When 
changes after both types of announcements are insignificant then the null hypothesis in 
Kruskal-Wallis test is not usually rejected.  
 
Table 9. P-values in Kruskal-Wallis test that verify the asymmetry of changes just after 





AGR EBS EVN MMK OMV POST RBI SBO TKA VER VIG VOE WIE 
CCI 2 0.521 0.815 0.988 0.510 0.268 0.014 0.036 0.527 0.511 0.835 0.260 0.149 0.643 
DGO 2 0.102 0.955 0.006 0.276 0.006 0.136 0.884 0.681 0.976 0.873 0.178 0.437 0.100 
ISM 1 0.748 0.474 0.629 0.032 0.892 0.336 0.072 0.740 0.967 0.157 0.908 0.656 0.433 
LI 2 0.731 0.714 0.023 0.219 0.962 0.898 0.707 0.500 0.698 0.300 0.836 0.017 0.704 
NHS 1 0.612 0.483 0.368 0.545 0.016 0.955 0.492 0.731 0.879 0.734 0.399 0.806 0.273 
NFP 4 0.014 0.036 0.706 0.603 0.205 0.079 0.164 0.229 0.037 0.431 0.110 0.037 0.278 
PI 4 0.538 0.442 0.009 0.028 0.761 0.406 0.105 0.763 0.790 0.042 0.198 0.713 0.011 
PPI 4 0.542 0.298 0.130 0.177 0.135 0.353 0.013 0.023 0.003 0.064 0.403 0.915 0.026 
cPPI 5 0.313 0.187 0.140 0.367 0.249 0.083 0.042 0.001 0.041 0.029 0.950 0.984 0.048 
GDP 1 0.432 0.038 0.125 0.068 0.706 0.407 0.434 0.730 0.875 0.139 0.702 0.573 0.480 
Notes: In this table we present p-values in Kruskal-Wallis tests only for indicators with at least one of null hypothesis 
rejection. 
 
The last two rows of Table 8 show that the strongest reaction after good news is 
observed in the stock prices of EBS, RBI, and VOE. These are the same companies that react 
most strongly to bad news. From this we can conclude that the strength of changes in stock 
prices is mainly related to liquidity of the stock. Confirmation of this conjecture is given by 
 the fact that the weakest reaction for both bad and good news is observed in the case of EVN 
and MMK, which have the lowest number of trades in Table 2. 
 
 Table 10. Length of significant cumulative changes in stock returns after bad news from the 
US economy 
 ANDR EBS EVN MMK OMV POST RBI SBO TKA VER VIG VOE WIE 
CCI 15 20 0 0 60 0 60 0 10 35 0 60 60 
CPI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 25 0 (10) 5 
cCPI 0 0 0 0 5 0 5 0 0 5 0 (10) 5 
DGO (5) 5 0 0 5 5 0 0 45 0 5 (55) 20 
EHS 5 (10) (5) 0 20 10 5 0 15 0 0 20 0 
HS 0 0 0 (55) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
IP 0 0 0 (5) 10 (5) (25) 0 0 0 10 60 5 
ISM 60 60 0 0 25 0 35 10 50 5 10 20 20 
IJC 25 55 0 (5) 0 0 5 (5) 10 5 15 20 0 
LI 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NHS 0 0 (5) 10 0 60 0 0 0 (5) 0 10 30 
NFP 35 25 0 0 20 0 60 55 30 15 10 (55) 60 
PI 0 0 (10) 0 0 0 0 (50) 0 5 (10) 0 0 
PFBOS (5) 0 0 (55) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PPI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 5 
cPPI 0 0 (5) (5) 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 
GDP 20 30 (15) 0 (10) 0 40 0 15 35 5 60 0 
RS (5) 10 0 0 0 (5) 5 20 5 (10) 20 60 5 
cRS (10) 10 0 (5) 5 10 5 15 0 25 10 60 5 




60 60 0 0 60 5 60 35 45 35 55 60 60 
Note: This table presents the length (in minutes) of an uninterrupted period from news announcement with significant (at 
least at the 5% level) mean of 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡 . When the mean of 𝐶𝐴𝑅1 is insignificant then the period is measured form 5 minutes 
after news announcements. The length of this second period is presented in parentheses.  
 
 Cumulative impact of news announcements 
Tables 10 and 11 present the result of the analysis of the cumulative impact of US 
macroeconomic news announcements. More precisely, they contain values of the length of the 
 period from news announcements with significant expected values of 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡 .10 For example, 
the value of 15 for ANDR after CCI announcements in the top left corner of Table 5 means 
that after CCI announcements means of 𝐶𝐴𝑅1 , 𝐶𝐴𝑅2 , and 𝐶𝐴𝑅3  are significant. When the 
mean of 𝐶𝐴𝑅1  is insignificant we alternatively measure the length of the uninterrupted 
significant cumulative impact of the event starting from 𝑡 = 2. Its length is presented in 
parentheses. When both means of 𝐶𝐴𝑅1 and 𝐶𝐴𝑅2 are insignificant a value of 0 is reported.  
Table 11. Length of significant cumulative changes in stock returns after good news from the 
US economy 
 ANDR EBS EVN MMK OMV POST RBI SBO TKA VER VIG VOE WIE 
CCI 10 15 0 0 5 5 5 0 0 10 10 5 15 
CPI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (55) 0 0 0 (55) 
cCPI 0 0 0 (5) 0 0 0 (10) (55) 0 0 35 10 
DGO 0 15 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 
EHS 10 15 0 (10) 0 15 5 (5) 0 0 5 15 10 
HS 5 5 0 (25) 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 
IP 0 15 (5) 10 0 0 (10) 0 (5) (55) (5) 15 0 
ISM 60 40 (55) 45 55 0 40 30 15 20 40 60 50 
IJC 15 60 (10) (20) 30 0 35 (5) 0 60 0 30 20 
LI 0 0 (35) (55) 0 0 0 0 0 (5) (15) 0 0 
NHS 0 5 (20) 0 5 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 
NFP 60 60 0 0 60 25 60 60 60 30 60 60 35 
PI 0 0 0 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 (5) 0 5 
PFBOS 0 5 0 5 (10) 0 5 0 0 0 0 10 0 
PPI 0 0 (5) (55) 0 (5) 5 60 5 5 0 0 (45) 
cPPI (10) 0 60 0 0 5 5 15 0 0 0 0 60 
GDP 60 60 5 25 5 0 30 (5) 60 0 5 5 5 
RS 20 60 (20) (45) (30) (5) 45 0 0 0 60 15 5 
cRS 15 60 (20) (45) 30 (5) 40 0 0 5 (55) 35 25 




60 60 (55) 50 60 45 50 25 55 60 55 60 60 
Note: This table presents the length (in minutes) of an uninterrupted period from news announcement with significant (at 
least at the 5% level) mean of 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡 . When the mean of 𝐶𝐴𝑅1 is insignificant then the period is measured form 5 minutes 
after news announcements. The length of this second period is presented in parentheses.  
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 When we are only interested in the significance of news an impact analysis of returns and standardized returns 
give the same results. 
  
In Table 10 we observe that the strongest cumulative impact is implied by CCI values 
lower  than expected: for OMV, RBI, VOE and WIE cumulative abnormal returns are 
significant up to 60 minutes after news announcements. In the case of bad news from NFP 
and ISM two such long periods are observed.  
We can also observe cases of delayed significant reaction. For example, for VOE there 
are four values in parentheses indicating that the cumulative reaction is significant only from 𝑡 = 2. However, a comparison with the results from Table 3 indicates that changes in returns 
of VOE in the first 5-minute period are significant, but at the 10% level. Nevertheless, these 
results show that in some cases new information needs more time to be significantly 
incorporated into prices. 
When all bad news  is jointly considered (without IJC) for only two companies (EVN 
and MMK) are insignificant cumulative changes observed. Returns of the other companies 
show significant changes at least in five-minute period.  
The strongest cumulative impact of good news is observed after NFP announcements 
where there are 8 cases of significant 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡  in one-hour periods. From Table 6 we observe a 
delayed reaction of EVN and MMK returns to good news from the American economy. This 
fact is indicated by the large number of values in parentheses. 
Impact of extreme news 
Tables 12 and 13 reports results of the event study analysis performed on the basis of 
announcements of very surprising news. i.e. announcements with  𝑆𝑖𝑘  > 0.5 . The 𝐴𝑆𝑅      1 
values just after bad news presented in Table 12 are mainly smaller than the respective 
averages in Table 7. This means that restricting the analysis only to announcements with a 
large difference between the announced and expected value of the indicator leads to a stronger 
reaction of investors. Actually, only after announcements of PI do 𝐴𝑆𝑅      1 values increase, but 
this is mainly due to the very specific impact of this indicator. As can be seen in Tables 7 and 
8 announcements of PI are usually followed by positive values of the average 𝐴𝑆𝑅      1 for both 
bad and good news. 
For most of the indicators restricting the analysis reduces the number of significant 
averages of abnormal returns 𝐴𝑆𝑅1. We suppose that (as in the case of EBS) this is caused by 
the changes in the sample length.  
 
 
 Table 12. Average abnormal standardized returns in first five minutes after bad news from the US economy. Announcements with  𝑆𝑖𝑘  > 0.5 
  ANDR EBS EVN MMK OMV POST RBI SBO TKA VER VIG VOE WIE 
CCI(33) -0.66* -0.46*** 0.03 0.02 -0.50** 0.17 -0.90*** 0.22 -0.13 -0.18 -0.07 -0.42* -0.59** 
CPI(39) -0.06 -0.17 0.04 0.15 -0.33 -0.10 -0.14 -0.33** -0.17 -0.48*** -0.15 -0.33* -0.63** 
cCPI(41) -0.17 -0.13 -0.03 0.06 -0.51** -0.13 -0.35** -0.37* -0.05 -0.37** -0.33 -0.32 -0.51** 
DGO(43) -0.25* -0.70*** -0.01 0.00 -0.52*** a -0.11 -0.34*** -0.14 -0.50*** -0.32*** -0.70*** -0.50** a -0.46*** 
EHS(27) -0.55** -0.53** a -0.05 -0.01 -0.66** -0.05 -0.36** 0.16 -0.10 -0.23 -0.13 -0.70*** -0.11 
HS(55) -0.01 -0.34 0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.02 0.16 -0.08 0.10 -0.04 -0.20** -0.03 -0.23 
IP(63) -0.27 -0.18 0.05 -0.06 -0.38*** -0.07 -0.29** -0.14 0.00 -0.26* -0.28** -0.34*** -0.11* 
ISM(23) -1.24*** -1.54*** a -0.07 -0.01 -1.43*** -0.53 -0.97*** -0.71*** -0.71*** -0.58*** -0.58** -1.01*** -0.54 
IJC(179) -0.24*** -0.44*** 0.01 -0.20 -0.20** a -0.21*** -0.34*** a -0.10** -0.16*** -0.24*** -0.15*** -0.27*** -0.15*** a 
LI(18) -0.14 -0.50 0.42*** -0.05 -0.13 -0.37 -0.27 -0.16 -0.03 0.26 -0.20 -0.33 -0.55* 
NHS(18) -0.33a -0.50*** -0.31 -0.33 0.15 -0.03 -0.26 -0.20 0.21 -0.18 -0.29** 0.13 0.01 
NFP(37) -1.01***a -1.19*** -0.67 a -0.20 -1.13*** a -0.21 -1.25*** -0.81*** a -0.71** -1.04*** a -0.73*** -1.36*** a -1.22*** 
PI(28) 0.38*** 0.37 -0.13 -0.11 0.33 0.21 0.42 0.47 0.34** 0.41 0.10 0.21 0.06 
PFBOS(47) -0.37**a -0.23 -0.09 -0.05 -0.18 -0.05 -0.15 -0.20* -0.14 0.00 -0.13 -0.21 -0.06 
PPI(40) -0.20 -0.29** -0.02 -0.04 -0.32** 0.11 -0.19*** 0.10 -0.12 -0.03 -0.12 -0.34** a -0.06 
cPPI(43) -0.12 -0.28 -0.08 0.00 -0.19 0.07 -0.03 -0.06 -0.23** -0.15 0.02 0.00 -0.28** 
GDP(37) -0.33** -0.62*** -0.04 -0.12 -0.71*** a -0.23 -0.68*** -0.50 -0.51*** -0.33** -0.67*** -0.64*** -0.37*** 
RS(54) -0.32** -0.74*** -0.03 -0.10 -0.26*** -0.47 -0.55*** -0.57*** -0.03* -0.19* -0.64*** -0.67*** -0.42** 
cRS(47) -0.64***a -0.91*** a 0.06 -0.12 -0.43*** -0.54*** -0.76*** a -0.60*** -0.35** a -0.34*** -0.79*** a -0.94*** a -0.53** 
All(631) -0.32*** -0.41*** -0.01 -0.08 -0.33*** -0.11** -0.36*** -0.17*** -0.16*** -0.23*** -0.27*** -0.38*** -0.29*** 
All without IJC(532) -0.33*** -0.42*** -0.05 -0.05 -0.39*** -0.10* -0.37*** -0.20*** -0.14*** -0.21*** -0.32*** -0.41*** -0.33*** 
Notes: *, **, *** – indicates significance of expected value of 𝐴𝑆𝑅𝑡  at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
a
 – indicates significance of expected value of 𝐴𝑆𝑅𝑡  value for a sample of very bad announcements at the 5% level. 
 
 Table 13. Average abnormal standardized returns in first five minutes after good news from the US economy. Announcements with  𝑆𝑖𝑘  > 0.5 
  ANDR EBS EVN MMK OMV POST RBI SBO TKA VER VIG VOE WIE 
CCI(42) 0.48*** 0.28*** -0.11 -0.10 0.09 0.10 0.26** 0.10 -0.17 0.02 0.17* 0.02 0.43*** 
CPI(53) -0.06 -0.27 0.01 -0.06 0.12 -0.20 0.06 -0.28 0.01 0.25* -0.11* -0.02 0.05 
cCPI(60) 0.18 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 0.20 0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.19 0.11 -0.11 0.21** 0.17*** a 
DGO(38) 0.15 0.17 0.31** -0.02 -0.08 -0.12 0.06 -0.08 0.08 0.18 0.23** 0.39 0.34 
EHS(27) 0.22 0.37 -0.01 0.31 0.30* 0.28** 0.19 -0.02 0.31* -0.23 0.23** 0.62*** 0.15 
HS(39) 0.38** 0.42** -0.05 -0.20 0.03 0.04 0.72*** a -0.15 0.03 -0.05 0.10 0.19 0.24 
IP(44) 0.11 0.34*** 0.09 0.15*** 0.20 0.21 0.14 0.31 0.20 0.30** 0.09 0.42*** 0.24 
ISM(36) 0.70*** a 0.67*** 0.25** 0.10 0.67** 0.24** 1.00*** 0.71*** 0.41*** 0.23 0.65*** 0.80*** 0.36*** 
IJC(178) 0.17** 0.36*** -0.02 -0.14 0.21*** 0.03 0.24*** 0.04 0.17 a 0.35*** 0.12* 0.32*** 0.22* 
LI(36) 0.23* 0.12 0.38** 0.18 -0.18 0.16 0.16 0.10 0.17 -0.11 -0.08 0.13 -0.30 
NHS(23) 0.18 0.25 0.01 -0.29 0.10 0.32*** -0.19 0.02 0.11 0.18 0.05 -0.02 0.43 
NFP(25) 1.02*** 2.32*** 0.42*** a -0.12 1.70*** a 0.36 1.61*** 0.64*** 1.15*** 1.04*** a 1.40*** 2.50*** a 1.45*** a 
PI(28) 0.02 0.26 0.11 0.22*** -0.08 0.00 0.12 -0.10 -0.10 -0.04 0.01 0.03 0.25*** 
PFBOS(48) 0.01 0.34* 0.01 0.19* 0.23** -0.06 0.28** 0.32* a 0.09 -0.08 -0.07 0.49*** 0.19 
PPI(44) -0.20* -0.03 -0.20* -0.09 -0.07 -0.30 -0.18 -0.45* -0.13* -0.13 -0.03 -0.22* -0.12** 
cPPI(32) -0.33 -0.12 -0.21** 0.14 -0.26** -0.56*** -0.29** -0.28* -0.11 -0.24* 0.04 -0.26 -0.06 
GDP(32) 0.41** 1.25*** -0.23 0.39*** 0.35* 0.34*** 0.93*** 0.09* 0.56*** 0.20 0.70*** 0.52** 0.62* 
RS(39) 0.36* 0.65*** 0.21 0.21** 0.34* -0.44*** 0.64*** -0.15 -0.02 0.22** 0.41** 0.50*** 0.41** 
cRS(28) 0.50*** 0.75*** 0.29 0.37*** 0.47** -0.18** 0.76** -0.05 0.15 0.40** 0.57*** a 0.71*** 0.48** 
All(621) 0.30*** 0.46*** 0.07*** 0.04*** 0.25*** 0.07*** 0.35*** 0.09*** 0.18*** 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.40*** 0.31*** 
All without IJC(520) 0.28*** 0.46*** 0.07* 0.08*** 0.23*** 0.06*** 0.36*** 0.09* 0.19*** 0.14*** 0.23*** 0.42*** 0.31*** 
Notes: *, **, *** – indicates significance of expected value of 𝐴𝑆𝑅𝑡  at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
a
 – indicates significance of expected value of 𝐴𝑆𝑅𝑡  for sample of very bad announcements at the 5% level. 
 
 From the analysis of the impact of good news it is difficult to conclude whether the 
restriction weakens or strengthens changes in stock prices. In Table 13 the number of 𝐴𝑆𝑅      1 
values lower than in Table 8 is very close to the number of values greater than previously. 
However, when compared to the impact of bad news, in Table 13 we observe more cases 
when the restriction of the analysis reduces the number of significant means of abnormal 
returns (see for example CCI or EHS).  
Analogously to the previous subsection we performed bootstrap tests to verify whether 
restricting the sample of announcements only to very bad or very good news leads to a 
significantly stronger reaction. For announcements of 9 indicators averages 𝐴𝑆𝑅      1 for very bad 
news are significantly lower for at least one firm. However, only in the case of two indicators 
(NFP and cRS) can we state that reducing the sample of announcements gives significantly 
lower averages of 𝐴𝑆𝑅1 . Besides, there are no visible patterns or relationships among the 
results of the bootstrap tests. In addition, the analysis by companies does not lead to sharp 
results. The largest number of significant averages (4) is observed for the returns of four 
companies, namely ANDR, EBS, OMV, and VOE. 
The results of bootstrap tests for very good news are clearer. From Table 13 we can 
conclude that limiting the analysis to the sample of very good news does not give 
significantly stronger changes in stock prices. For the majority of indicators the average 𝐴𝑆𝑅      1 
computed on the basis of the restricted sample does not differ from the averages computed 
after other announcements. The only exception are announcements of NFP for which we 
observe five cases of the significant impact of the sample reduction. For four of them (EVN, 
OMV, VER, and VOE) the impact of very bad news (Table 12) was also stronger than other 
bad news. 
Changes in reaction strength 
In order to analyze how the impact of US macroeconomic news announcements on 
stock prices on the VES has changed in the last 15 years we performed an event study 
analysis in the subperiods. As described in the previous subsection we analyze the 
significance of the average of modified abnormal standardized returns 𝑀𝐴𝑆𝑅1 in the first five 
minutes after news announcements. Values of the averages 𝑀𝐴𝑆𝑅        1 in 4-year windows shifted 
every quarter are presented in Figure 10 for each company under consideration. All of them 
show a similar pattern to that observed for EBS in Figure 7.  
 
  
Figure 10. Averages of modified abnormal standardized returns (𝑀𝐴𝑆𝑅        1) of ATX stocks in 4-
year windows  
Notes: Modified abnormal standardized returns 𝑀𝐴𝑆𝑅1 are equal to 𝐴𝑆𝑅1 after good news announcements and are equal to −𝐴𝑆𝑅1 after bad news announcements. Averages (𝑀𝐴𝑆𝑅        1) of abnormal standardized returns of EBS in the first five minutes 
after US macroeconomic news announcements were computed in 4-year windows. Windows were shifted every three months 
to cover the whole period 2006-2020. On the X axis we marked the centers of the windows.  
 
 
Figure 11. Values of cumulated modified abnormal standardized returns 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑆𝑅𝑡  of ATX 
stocks.  
Notes: For a given time 𝑡  between January 1, 2006 and June 31, 2020 the value of cumulated modified abnormal 
standardized returns 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑆𝑅𝑡  equals the sum of 𝑀𝐴𝑆𝑅1  for all announcements of unexpected US macroeconomic news 
between January 1, 2006 and time 𝑡. Modified abnormal standardized returns 𝑀𝐴𝑆𝑅1 are equal to 𝐴𝑆𝑅1 after good news 
announcements and are equal to −𝐴𝑆𝑅1 after bad news announcements.  
 
 The highest values of the averages are observed in windows just after the global 
financial crisis that had started in the US. Then, in subsequent years, the power of changes in 
stock prices implied by unexpected news from the US economy decreased. Irrespective of 
these changes in magnitude, for most of companies under consideration the impact of US 
news is significant in each subperiod. The only exceptions are EVN and MMK where 
insignificant averages of 𝑀𝐴𝑆𝑅1  dominate. The weakening of the impact of US 
macroeconomic news at the end of the period meant that OMV, POST, and VIG had 
insignificant averages in the last subperiod. 
Another look at changes in the strength of reaction implied by US macroeconomic 
news follows from an analysis of Figure 11. As in Figure 9, here we present the values of 
cumulated modified abnormal standardized returns 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑆𝑅𝑡  computed for each company 
under consideration. As before, we can observe similar changes in their slopes. In the first 
period, before 2007, 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑆𝑅𝑡  graphs are horizontal. Then, almost simultaneously, the slopes 
increase. Of course, the strength of observed changes in slopes vary among companies and 
depend on a company‘s individual sensitivity to news from the US However, in late 2012 or 
at the beginning of 2013 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑆𝑅𝑡  slopes decrease for most stocks. This indicates a 




In this paper we analyzed the impact of unexpected news from the US economy 
included in announcements of 19 indicators on the prices of stocks of the largest and the most 
liquid stocks listed on the Vienna Stock Exchange. To do this we applied an event study 
analysis to 5-minute returns of 13 stocks from January 2006 to the end of June 2020. Taking 
such a long period into account allowed us also to investigate the changes in the strength of 
investors‘ reactions to US macro news in last 15 years. 
The main conclusion of the paper is that unexpected macroeconomic news from the 
US implies a strong and significant reaction of stock prices just after announcements. In the 
majority of cases significant changes in stock prices are visible mainly in the first five 
minutes after news release. Later, the changes are in general insignificant and of smaller 
magnitude. However, accumulation of these small changes leads to significant changes in 
stock prices observed one hour after news announcements. This confirms the results of 
Gurgul and Wójtowicz (2014, 2015) obtained for stock market indices. 
 A comparison of the impact of bad and good unexpected news shows that the later 
implies more cases of significant changes in stock prices. Regardless of the notion of 
information, the largest number of stocks with significant changes in returns is implied by 
announcements of the ISM Manufacturing Index (ISM) and Nonfarm Payrolls (NFP). The 
firms which significantly react to the largest number of announcements are EBS, WIE, VOE, 
and RBI. These are also the stocks with a very high average number of transactions per 
minute. On the other hand, the least liquid companies in the sample (EVN, MMK, SBO) show 
the smallest number of significant changes in returns implied by US news announcements. 
The values of average abnormal returns indicate that unexpected good news from the 
US economy usually leads to stronger changes in stock prices than unexpected bad news. 
However, an additional analysis and comparison of the distribution of abnormal returns after 
both groups of announcements showed that the hypothesis about the symmetry in investors‘ 
reactions can only be rejected in a few cases. Hence, we can conclude that the impact of good 
and bad news is in general symmetrical. 
An analysis in subperiods proves that the impact of unexpected news from the US was 
strongest during the global financial crisis 2007-2009. After that period the strength of 
changes in stock prices implied by the announcements decreased. However, for most 
companies under consideration the impact of US news is significant in each subperiod. The 
only exceptions are the least liquid stocks: EVN and MMK. A more detailed analysis of 
abnormal returns after each announcement revealed that an increased impact of macro news 
from the US was observed from the end of 2006 (when the first signs of the crisis were 
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